I.

PICREADI: How would you describe your political affiliation, if any? What made you choose Berlin as a place to live?

Louis L.: The background of my parents and later my studies and my personal involvement with the student movements in Brittany, where I was born, led me to establish a connection with the very radical part of the left wing in France. My mother was an active supporter of their ideas at a young age and my father lived a life of a hippie, not fitting in with the law-based functioning of society either. That meant I enjoyed a great freedom of action and thought, I was fairly sociable and reflected critically. One movement I joined was Nuit Debout (Up All Night). It was triggered by the attempt on the part of the government of Francois Hollande, whose popularity was falling in 2016 due to the failure to deliver on its promises, to reduce the chronically high unemployment rate by passing a law that would clearly favour the employer at the expense of the workers. The feeling of powerlessness in the people who surrounded me in Brest, the city I studied in back then, induced me to launch an initiative of my own. I set up a space where people were coming to talk about their concerns and discuss what things in the city or society as a whole they wished to change. Berlin feels like a place with a much freer spirit compared to where I lived before.

PICREADI: Would you argue then that there are certain issues with the state of civil society in France nowadays? Isn't the need to arrange a safe heaven for self-expression indicative?

Louis L.: Like-minded people I knew were conversing a lot among themselves, but those talks never translated into actions. My goal was to break the cycle by bringing in people from different layers of society, to facilitate the dialogue between the groups that would not meet and listen to each other in ordinary reality. I was inspired by the idea of the bottom-up change, I was around to help them voice an opinion. This is another meaning of breaking a common cycle, not following the routine we typically are as the citizens: waiting for elections once in every 5 years, casting a vote and allowing the specially trained people to decide our national life, under the impression that we ourselves are the ones who do so.

PICREADI: Have you ever thought of pursuing a career in state affairs?

Louis L.: No. Among my acquaintances there are those who chose to follow this path, and I could witness how it was transforming them and their lives. I am of a view that centralization, or even significant concentration of power in the hands of one person is affecting people negatively and makes them bad governors. However, the very grass-root level political moves, such as preparing the print-outs to distribute in the streets or at work with the aim to draw the people to a strike or a demonstration already make you feel responsible and take things seriously, perhaps too seriously, at times. Having tried that, I learned that I am capable of continuing, I am endowed with a sort of charism, patience, I am good at communicating and generating ideas, but it still did not feel like what I would like to do. This attitude might not be unique to me: this kind of political engagement requires a lot, one can easily get trapped or lost in its intensity. My vision was different, I sought to engage productively, to come up with something new and follow the path of my own.

II.

PICREADI: Throughout history of European integration, France repeatedly showed its preference for going it alone, moving in a different direction and preserving sovereignty. Does the EU exert a decisive influence on the French political agenda today?

Louis L.: Political movements of various kinds keep on shaping social life in France as it always had been the case. Those parties that form the government as of now do not intend to distance themselves from the EU and emphasize any specific national priorities. Quite the opposite, they deem the EU to be the best of the possible administrations, since it enables Europe to avoid any potential conflicts on its soil and at the same time, creates favorable conditions for the European and world economy. Their outlook is thus very much in line with what we call a liberal vision and it contributes to the growth of financial capitalism on a global scale. There was hardly any change in this regard over the last 30 years in France, this ideology is entrenched. So I would not say the empowered groups in my country today seek to underline France's distinction, the government rather functions in tandem with Germany and in symbiosis with the European institutions.

PICREADI: Do you estimate the relationship between the two states as being in the best possible shape? Does the Franco-German tandem excel?

Louis L.: Yes, I believe that the relationship at this point is very good. Talking about mutual perceptions between the French and the German citizens all the more so, there is no animosity or any kind of xenophobia whatsoever. Nevertheless, certain contradictions of economic character exist between the strategic concerns of the two countries. To be precise, the initial conditions stipulated by Germany for the EU to advance towards greater economic integration are now embedded in the Union's economic policy and clearly favour German, and not French, approach to economy. The issue is, the strategic choices made in Germany are imposed by the European institutions across the whole of Union, and they ultimately serve not the interests of the nation in France, but benefit exclusively those already on top who only keep growing richer and supporting this tendency.

PICREADI: There seems to be at least some awareness of the alienation of the citizens from the administration on the EU level, or even of an outright discontent with it, judging by the civil initiatives already run and proposed. When it comes to France, does the current president represent the majority of the population and if not, how was it made possible?

Louis L.: Macron does not represent the majority, simply by the numbers. In the first round of the presidential election of 2017, he obtained 20% of the votes, that equals around 10% of all the French. And when counting just how many people supported him in the second round, one may want to deduct the votes casted by the people who did so only to block the competing candidate representing le Front National (the National Front), the radical right wing. Macron did not have many people behind him, really. And then, as it often happens when the candidate seeks to be presented in the best light, is making promises and acting charismatic during the elections to be chosen, he afterwards realises his programme in a manner that is favoured by the sponsors of his campaign, the people whose interests he really represents and to whom he belongs ideologically. These are already the people in a privileged position in society and they will further benefit from the economic policies put forth by Macron and any other adjustments he carries out. He is not "the people's president", he can rather be characterized as the president of the rich, for the rich, and in the modern realities the economic elite is by definition a very limited circle of people. As long as we witness inequalities grow and the poverty gradually spreading we are sure to have the rich in minority and to identify President Macron's economic policy as obviously favoring the rich. To give an example, virtually the first decision taken by Macron in his new post was to abolish the wealth tax, which was maybe not particularly cost-effective but signalled to the population the state's willingness to act towards redistribution of the wealth. Strangely enough, no logical explanation of that move was offered, the tax was just cut, symbolically.

PICREADI: Macron acts like he has nothing to lose, pursuing policies in defiance of his own narratives, turning himself into an easy target for the counter-movements. Did he learn anything from the protests of the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) or will he ignore popular dissatisfaction?

Louis L.: I assume he was aware of it in the first place, that his rating was going to fall. Macron did not stake on public approval, he does not aspire to be popular, his task is different. The president is set to implement reforms that are far from being egalitarian and will actually exacerbate inequalities and contribute to the precarisation of the people, general social anxiety and ultimately, a complete precarisation of all the social interactions people are involved in. Macron might himself be adhering to the ideology of his circle, but whether this is the case or not, what he does is aimed at strengthening the position of those in possession of substantial financial resources, in political control and craving to possess more and control better. Because of that, I believe Macron will not learn anything or alter his course of actions, he does not listen to what people have to say and responds only superficially to contain the unrest. His reaction to the demands of the gilets jaunes was not to grant what was being requested but was at first to simulate a kind of a grand national debate on the television where he met the mayors of the country. However, the whole thing was a joke: the mayors were carefully selected, asked to comment on the situation briefly, everything was pre-planned by the team of his administration, they simulated democracy. What is more, Macron ordered the police to quell the street protests by violent means; what was previously condemned or excused as police brutality and mistreatment, was now taken a step further. The French police was sanctioned to use the defensive ball launchers, or LBD40, to shoot — which is prohibited by the law — at the level of people's heads, faces. They injured and mutilated many.

PICREADI: The EU authorities reproach its newly admitted members, such as Poland and Hungary, of human rights violations and deficient division of power. Minding the situation in France you have just described, would you say that the status of a big country and EU founding member insulates certain European countries from the EU internal controls or makes those deviations overlooked?

Louis L.: It seems apparent to me that the big countries that could boast about the condition of their civil societies some 30 years ago, meaning they were truly leaning towards progressive values, economic and gender equality, protection of minorities et cetera have been gradually losing those achievements with each successive government. Of course this will not be said and hypocrisy abounds, but the states at the forefront of shaming of the new member countries are oftentimes way worse than those they are decrying as violators of the human rights and the rights to freedom of expression. So yes, in my view, there is a flagrant hypocrisy in France today with regard to discourses on whom we can hold accountable. For example recently, returning from his trip on an airplane, Macron made a statement, saying that we in France should still be able to distinguish between dictatorship and democracy: the former is way more violent and authoritarian, while France remains a democratic country and there is no point in complaining. I am sorry about having to make it clear: when the constitutional right of the citizens to manifest freely is not respected, because people cannot go protest without feeling scared of losing their eyesight, limbs or being otherwise injured, no, we are not any longer in a democracy that guarantees the very basic right to civilian self-expression in the public space.

III.

PICREADI: In parallel with these developments, President Macron positions himself as a true European: he calls for the creation of a European army to defend the continent against any probable threat, including Russia or even the US. Is this merely a rhetorical gesture? Are his internal and external policies interconnected, not only touching on that but also with respect to the former French colonies and all the other aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy?

Louis L.: This is going to be my personal point of view, but I think that the French foreign policy today is nothing but colonialist. France is not just a country which relies on its mineral resources and strives towards greater autonomy in both energy and technology sectors, it actually deploys its armed forces abroad, interferes economically and ensures it is getting to sign the contracts for extraction, industrial projects and the like, doing all of that in a very dominant, colonial-type manner. Within the framework of the EU, France considers itself as the second most important country, a country which is powerful and which matters, also as a global actor, thanks to its culture, language, history, progressive society and, as always, because of the importance of the French revolution and the ideas associated with it. Though this list is not complete if we are not to mention as well those French companies, still existing, that hold onto the strategic shares of resources they once acquired.

PICREADI: Is there in France a narrative of guilt before the former colonies or are there policies aimed at silencing or reinterpreting the memories of the colonial past?

Louis L.: What is happening with this issue now is that there are a number of movements, mostly left-leaning, that seek to keep those memories alive. This is not to say they are asking for forgiveness or engage in self-flagellation, they are just reminding the people that France was not, or maybe is not, today, the country that succeeded at putting into practice its ideals of equality, brotherhood and freedom so far. These people want us to think of atrocities France committed throughout its history: colonisation and domination of other countries, the wars it waged against them, the massacres it perpetrated, often justifying its strategy as pursued in the name of the constitution. I thus would not say there is a narrative whose purpose is to hide or cover up what is going on today by drawing attention to the horrors of our history, but rather, quite the contrary, there is a narrative that seeks to liberate us from the guilt, to emphasize all of this is gone and in the past, things are different now, our former colonies came to become free countries that decide for themselves. No efforts are made to distract the public from the modern strategies of the country; instead, the point they make is that there is no use feeling guilty and it is better to stop wailing and go back to the serious business.

PICREADI: Do you not see a contradiction between the post-colonial, metropolitan French identity and that of the EU, its present-day European element?

Louis L.: This question is difficult to answer. First of all, some of the EU member countries have colonial histories much more loaded with violence than the others and then there are countries that have not colonised anybody, but still have their peculiar past full of massacres, genocides or deadly wars. It is fair to conclude that in Europe, generally speaking, there is a conscience of war as a common background for everyone. It can manifest itself in the feeling of guilt, national or not, or in other traces on the level of the country's society, with the spirit of the people bearing memories of the deadly years for generations. If we take the UK, for instance, I believe that its colonial past is mostly left behind whereas we in France are facing the consequences of colonisation to this day. There exist political movements tackling the colonial legacy in different ways: some celebrate it, feel nostalgic about the time when France was dominating other territories and competed for the title of the most powerful country — others point out at the negative effects of colonisation in a way that is just absurd since they look at the children of the immigrants, coming from Algerian immigration for example. This stream of thought is caught in an intellectual paradox: without planning to do so, they make it all the more obvious that the construction of the French identity around one single religion, one ethnicity et cetera is no longer tenable after the kind of the colonial engagement practiced by France, however they keep on pointing fingers to the differences and create a divide within society. In sum, there is a great diversity of developments having to do with the conflictual past across Europe, among them also the aggressive reactions towards our inseparable past.

IV.

PICREADI: The previous question was also a lead-up to this one: does the active French involvement overseas hamper the ability of the EU to act on the global stage?

Louis L.: I do not believe the EU today is capable of acting collectively outside of its borders. All that is done in a joint effort is the implementation of the common economic policy internally or also affecting external economic policies of the members, along with the defence of the external borders of the Union from the alleged invasion by very straightforward, authoritarian methods. The EU is basically the interior police plus the largely interior enforcement of the economic policy, nothing else. The foreign policy of the Union is a sum of the foreign policies of its constitutive states that base their strategies on whatever business, energy and geopolitical interests they might have.

PICREADI: Is this also true of the US? Do bilateral relations count more than the dynamics between the bloc and the US?

Louis L.: Every couple of countries weighs differently. For example, the historical connection between the US and France is stronger and closer as compared to the US-German relationship. This is due to the fact that France, for most of its history, was part of NATO and held a seat at the UN Security Council. The EU would like to see both France and Germany having seats at the SC, and the protracted negotiations on that matter are under way. The idea is, the history behind the current SC setup should no longer determine its configuration and so there are no conditions requested, it is just that from now on, Germany can well have a say. However, France is a member of two groups the US belongs to or even chairs, NATO and the SC, no wonder this bilateral relationship has a long record. This is to say, surely, bilateral ties are of a bigger significance than the US-EU interaction, with every relationship characterized by its unique qualities. In addition, I would argue that the connection between the formal institutional bodies promoting the EU economic interests and the US principally resides in their shared interests in the markets of the third world and the financial standing they enjoy there. Euro is an essential currency, capitalisation of the world's rich depends very much on its strength. It is therefore indispensable for euro to remain a demanded, desired currency across the American continent as well as in the markets of China, India and Russia.

PICREADI: Why is the EU coming up with supplementary pan-European security initiatives when there is always NATO? Does the Union still perceive the US as the guarantor of its security or does it think of gaining autonomy in this sphere, too?

Louis L.: Let's suppose the EU is going to last for some more time. As I mentioned earlier, France maintains a close military cooperation with the US but in spite of that since the end of the WW2 France decided to take care of its own armed forces, nuclear arsenal and achieve an overall military self-reliance. So when it comes to France, the US is not at all a guarantor of its security, since French military strategy is to uphold its autonomy, and for that to be in possession of submarines, aircraft carriers, its own fleet, aviation et cetera. We continue to produce the Dassault Rafale, for example, and we even sell these fighter aircrafts, for better or worse, to the states such as Saudi Arabia. We are set to maintain an army and develop our own technologies, however this is questioned today, since there is a number of state-of-the-art American technologies that are being bought in order to equip the French army, meaning we are gradually losing our autonomy on the level of military strategy. All in all, I would argue that Europe today no longer regards the US as a guarantor of its security, partly because Europe does not sincerely fear any other actor. I do not think Europe is really concerned about military threats emanating from Russia, China or anybody else in this point in time, it is used to the relative stability and treats its economic expansion and development as priority, since strong euro is what allows Europe for a greater room for manoeuvre.

V.

PICREADI: In the matters of Ukrainian crisis, both current and preceding presidents of France together with the Chancellor Merkel led the efforts to reconcile Russia and Ukraine. We all know of the Minsk Agreements that according to the plan have to be respected and fulfilled by both sides to pave the wave for peace. This, however, is not happening and judging by the shape of the Ukrainian state, any deeper integration with the EU is not to come true in the foreseeable future. This question touches upon the intentions of France in supporting the EU course of actions. On the one hand, with all of its foreign campaigns, the French Republic allows for interventions and military engagement; on the other, France and other European states were not that happy about sanctions and only voiced their concerns gingerly. Are pacifism and peace-making today a chiefly German motion, extended to the whole of the EU?

Louis L.: To begin with, in my opinion, neither the preceding nor the actual president have been clear in how they regarded Russia, the Ukrainian crisis and the situation with Crimea. European politicians keep referring to the Minsk Agreements and how they must be complied with, but I would argue that the French presidents never really clarified their position vis-a-vis the US and in this connection, what approach is being followed in diplomatic relations with Russia. I cannot be sure about the exact strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and whether there was one, though it must be noted that the French stance in this type of conflicts normally is not to put itself in a sharp opposition but instead to resolve the disputes on bilateral basis and preserve the alliances. After all, both the US and Russia are considered our partners, without Russian energy supply the life would be much more complicated for France. Russia is the neighbor of the EU which is able to provide us with quality energy in the most efficient way, and the EU needs that energy to maintain the high living standards of its citizens, its industry and economic prosperity. Things would only change in the EU-Russia relations if at some point the EU stops being a crucial market for the Russian resources and the EU, in its turn, decreases its demand or acquires different suppliers. In this scenario, certain politicians in certain countries would feel like they have their hands untied and would maybe choose to show more opposition to the Russian claims and would generally take a tougher line in relations with Russia. Nevertheless, this course of events is highly unlikely as of today and the risk of entering into a serious conflict with Russia is negligible, status quo persists. What we hear public figures saying with respect to Ukraine is: well, morally, we disagree, but Russia is our friend anyway so we have to try to reach an understanding, to arrive at a compromise and most importantly, to bring back peace. It is a kind of a nursery rhyme repeated by the European politicians, they see the EU as the peace promoter, whose internal priority is just that: to avoid any conflicts on its soil.

PICREADI: When we learn about the origin of public diplomacy, we typically mention France as the country that was the first to start taking care of its image and increase its appeal internationally. Does France continue on this path today?

Louis L.: The image of the French Republic was constructed around and capitalized on the image of the French Revolution. When the US declared its independence, France was quick to assure the newborn country of its support — that move fell in line with how France wanted to be seen. In numerous examples its strategy appears paradoxical: France was all at once a coloniser and an advocate for the movements of independence or a mediator between the conflicting sides. Not always does France engage constructively, however it still does so with a purpose to affirm itself as an avant garde of diplomacy. Take the recent case of Libya, back in 2007 ruled by dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who agreed to sponsor presidential campaign of Nicolas Sarkozy in exchange for breaking economic blockade and improving international standing of Libya. Some years after it was done, the French ambassador to Libya, a well-known philosopher but also a staunch supporter of the French political and economic interests, Bernard-Henri Levy, advised President Sarkozy to turn against his benefactor and launch a coalition military attack in Libya on the model of American invasion of Iraq, allegedly aimed at liberating the Libyan people from oppressor. We are now aware of the consequences of that decision: a complete destabilisation of the country, its partition among militias, torturing, imprisonment and other mistreatment of the African migrants to Europe whose route was passing by Libya et cetera. The brilliant idea of one French man to free the Libyan people brought about bad outcomes.

PICREADI: The so-called hybrid threats posed by Russia are an important item on NATO's agenda for some time already. Among them is the alleged meddling in the electoral processes in the West along with support given by Russia to the radical parties, such as le Front National in France and AfD in Germany. When it comes to public opinion in these countries, would you say that the people share concerns for Russian intervention?

Louis L.: I believe that France simply leaves this opportunity to intervene into its domestic affairs to Russia. Were France sincerely outraged and opposed to the Russian intervention, it would come up with the new regulations or alter its political system to prevent this from happening. All the declarations and accusations by the sides to this tension seem innocent to me, there is nothing dangerous about this kind of involvement. Again, if France wanted to somehow protect itself, it would adopt certain measures, it is perfectly able to do so. At this level, I do not see Russia as a great disturbance to the internal affairs of the Republic, and surely not a greater disturbance than the influence of the US. I do not buy that. I see this narrative as a media manipulation rather than as popularisation of the facts that truly matter. What I do think however is that in some other spheres Russia is indeed very powerful and it can cause problems for the European diplomacy. The developments in the sectors of technology, its military branch, internet and cyber attacks Russia is increasingly skilled at worry the EU states for a good reason. In this regard, yes, there are fears concerning safety and security of the state in France, its vulnerabilities and the ways they can be manipulated — here again, Russia is no greater potential disturbance than the US. I guess what is happening in Europe reflects Russia's desire to be on an equal footing with the US in its capability to affect political processes of the countries that can be of Russia's interest. In brief, when it comes to France, there exists a well-grounded concern for the need to defend itself against the state which dominates France technologically and is capable of intervening into concrete political situations.

VI.

PICREADI: Media plays a key role in forming the image of the country abroad. What is up with the censorship in the French media, are they pressured to represent Russia at a certain angle?

Louis L.: I will now paint a general picture of the media landscape in France. First of all, the condition of the journalism is defined by the fact that the majority, almost 90% of the major newsrooms belong to 5 French billionaires. Hence the problems with independent coverage. And then this issue is complicated by the tendency within those redactions to fire journalists whose outlook does not fit with the editorial slant and to accept only those whose thinking is already identical to that of their bosses. These people do not experience any pressure since they were admitted for their ideology and are being paid for its promotion, there is no criticism to expect. Contrariwise, those journalists who choose to persevere in the big news outlets despite standing out and not sharing the common line do suffer from, for starters, economic pressure, whereby they do not have sufficient budgetary and time resources to move on with their serious journalistic work. Profound investigation, cross-checking of information, fake news detection et cetera are not being encouraged. It gets harder with every year for journalists with alternative ideas and critical thinking to continue doing their job in the big news platforms in France. So yes, there are certain ideas that cannot be proposed or discussed seriously in the French media space. At the same time, there recently was a resurgence of all kinds of alternative media, many non-mainstream news sources are launched from the social networks. Sputnik France is an example of a foreign-affiliated media that offers an alternative outlook on various international issues. The polls show that the TV audience is glad to face greater diversity of opinions, there is lively interest towards media representing different geopolitical entities, such as Russia-related sources including Sputnik France or also Al Jazeera. It is a remarkable phenomenon, radicals from both right and left sides of the political spectrum crave dissimilar, critical assessments of the international conflicts. Sputnik France was actually the first media to invite representatives of gilets jaunes after they were fired by the police to talk about what brought them to the streets and what they are standing up for. These people were at last given full freedom to comment on the manifestations in an objective, critical manner; for instance, they were not just using the official numbers of the Ministry of Interior, but also quoting independent sources. These Sputnik-issued materials seemed less partial and subjective than what is normally offered by the mainstream media whose editorial slants appear to merge and deviate from neutrality, favoring a particular orientation, namely that of pro-American, pro-liberal politics.

PICREADI: The 1990s in Russia were years of politico-economic transition that never led to the desired result. Still, according to the constitution, Russia is a democratic country and many people here look up to the model of liberal market society. Does Europe consider Russia a Western country? Was operation in Crimea an action that cancelled the concept of Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok?

Louis L.: In the course of history and geography in the French schools students learn that Europe ends at the Ural mountains. We do also think of Russia in the context of Eurasia, but all in all, Russia is regarded as a part of Europe, its Western territory with the major cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg belongs to Europe by definition. Even so, Russia's move in Ukraine went against the idea of what is Europe because it was the first military action of one country against another on the European territory in many years. It was perceived as a brutal use of force that threatened Europe's peace and stability. This was the perception, I am not saying this was exactly the case because the leading media of each country painted the situation to their liking but ultimately the perception of most people was that Russia took over the Crimea in an ill-considered desire to back the interests of majority of the population. Be it so or not, the conduct of an armed conflict to anybody's benefit on the European ground is viewed extremely negatively by most Europeans and that clearly led to the growing distance between how we look at Russia and what we think of Europe. I would like to reiterate, in my view, this is quite strange since we do not normally consider Russia a member of any Asian bloc but on the contrary, we look at it as at the country that may not be part of the EU but remains an integral part of Europe and is closely related to it historically.

VII.

PICREADI: The estrangement between Russia and the Western allies did not start with the Ukrainian crisis; Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 unambiguously signalled Russian dissatisfaction with the NATO policy of expansion. It is believed in Russia that everything needed was done to express this attitude and discourage NATO from continuing on that path.

Louis L.: Russia has valid reasons to feel concerned. I want to add to my points on the changes in perceptions prompted by the Ukrainian crisis: in Europe, or at least in France, this is what I know best, there is a growing awareness of the fact that the key difference between the politics of Russia and for example France lies not in the degree of violence or disregard for constitution, it is actually just Russian inexperience in disguise of its ruptures with constitutional provisions. This is a kind of a counterpoint to the other trend in perceptions I mentioned. Cynically enough, France views itself as a master of concealment of its reality of the non-respect for constitution and other laws. So I do not think Russia is a worse offender of its own laws than any other country in Europe. I would even argue that things are way more troubling in France today, the state overtly attacks the population. Looking to Russia, I say to myself: well, they are just not as good as us yet at disguising their crimes against their own legislation.

PICREADI: Are you talking of a fear of self on the part of Europe, an unpleasant feeling of disclosure of the facts that some people would prefer to keep obscure?

Louis L.: Yes, and also there is a big sympathy towards Putin's Russia among the activists and the far right movements owing to the sense of a deep hypocrisy of the EU in connection with what I just described, and on the other side, of the frankness, straightness of Russians in their domestic and foreign policies. Russia demonstrates honesty where European countries show gravest hypocrisy, namely in their attitude towards violence they use against their very populations. Going back to your question about NATO, Russia has all the reasons to worry and to point to the highly ambiguous manoeuvres undertaken by Europe and the US. I mentioned it earlier that in my opinion, recent presidents of France led extremely ambiguous discourses concerning Russia, and the EU advances vis-a-vis Russia were just as ambiguous. On the one hand, they choose to act nicely and appear cordial when it comes to accommodating Russian energy sources in Europe, however on the other hand, in the geostrategic and military domains they allow for the backhanded steps. Thus, the EU agreed to host the US-provided, US-installed and US-coordinated missiles in the area as sensitive as the border with Russia to suit the needs that are not European. It is indeed very weird and ambiguous, why do European countries accept this dependency on the external power that does not serve their interests, complicates their bilateral relations with Russia and gives Russia a reason to be alarmed about the efficiency of its military strategies and interior security?

PICREADI: We now see the post-Cold War arms control system falling apart, and Europe understandably tries to get Russia and the US back to the negotiating table to do something to ensure the security of Europe. In your perspective, though, it looks like the EU itself bears a large share of responsibility for what is happening.

Louis L.: I assume that Europe is concerned because it plays a troubled game and knows it. Europe might be worried about being exposed to retaliation, threats, attacks just because it does not play a fair game and in doing so one inevitably carries a sense of guilt about acting against one's alleged partners behind their backs. The ambiguous manoeuvres of certain European politicians who let the US interfere with the EU affairs and their relations with Russia expose just that: this politician leads a dishonest game with Russia and actually jeopardizes the peace in Europe with his or her own hands.